- Reader James Huff passes along this (Bloomington) Pantagraph story from last October of a lawsuit in Illinois over a police shooting of a driver after a car chase. The driver was drunk and had multiple drug convictions for which he was on probation at the time of the incident. The officer said he shot the driver when the driver tried to run him down. Of course, it’s Not About The Money:
Dorris said Ruch’s parents, Jack and Margery Ruch, are more interested in details of the incident becoming public than collecting a financial settlement.
“The thing the Ruch family wants the most is to search for the truth,” Dorris said. “If we have to try this case to get that, then it’ll be tried.”
That didn’t stop them from requesting that the details of the settlement remain private, though. They later changed their mind after the local paper sued; they settled for $750,000.
- Via Howard Bashman: on Monday, the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court opinion finding the police liable when a drunk driver killed another driver. The court agreed that (treating the victim’s allegations as true) the police were incompetent, but incompetence does not create a violation of constitutional rights. (Whatever happened to “Don’t make a federal case out of it?”) The opinion is here (PDF).
Archive for February, 2007
Trial lawyer’s macaca moment?
Michael Kinsley famously defined a “gaffe” as when a politician accidentally tells the truth. If so, plaintiff’s lawyer Anthony Buzbee committed an awfully big gaffe last year (caught on tape!), as Peter Lattman explains in the Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog (See also W$J). It’s an open secret that trial lawyers venue shop for the best possible jurisdiction to file a lawsuit, but they rarely describe it openly, particularly in stark racial terms:
“That venue probably adds about seventy-five percent to the value of the case,” he said. “You’ve got an injured Hispanic client, you’ve got a completely Hispanic jury, and you’ve got an Hispanic judge. All right. That’s how it is.”
In other parts of Texas, Buzbee went on, a plaintiff may have the burden of showing “here’s what the company did wrong, all right? But when you’re in Starr County, traditionally, you need to just show that the guy was working, and he was hurt. And that’s the hurdle: Just prove that he wasn’t hurt at Wal-Mart, buying something on his off time, and traditionally, you win those cases.”
I guess tort reformers won’t get any debate from Buzbee when they describe places like Starr County as judicial hellholes (PDF).
Buzbee’s a trial lawyer, not a politician, so his reaction is entirely predictable: as per the Galveston County Daily News (and press release from Buzbee’s lawyers), Buzbee is suing the people who ran the seminar and those who allegedly taped him, claiming that he agreed to give his talk on the condition that it not be recorded, and further claiming that circulating the tape was done to “damage his career.” It seems to me that “The truth will damage my career” is perhaps not the smartest p.r. strategy, but I guess we’ll see how his suit goes.
They asked for it, they got it
Despite its calamitous and demagogic handling of Katrina flood insurance claims, it’s worth recalling that Mississippi has taken great strides toward cleaning up its formerly sorry reputation in other legal areas, personal injury litigation in particular. One business that seems to have noticed, per Pat Cleary at NAM (Feb. 28) is Toyota, the same company that passed over the Magnolia State in a plant-siting decision three years ago (see Apr. 30, 2004). The new Highlander assembly plant, be it noted, is to be located near Tupelo in the northeastern part of the state, far away from the storm-surge-peril zone. (“Toyota To Build Highlanders in Mississippi”, Car and Driver Daily Auto Insider, Feb. 28).
You can’t be too careful
No, literally: you can’t be too careful, or you may get in trouble.
In 2003, the Staten Island Ferry crashed into a pier at full speed, killing 11 people and injuring hundreds, because the pilot passed out; the pilot ultimately pled guilty to manslaughter. Victims and their families promptly sued New York City, which owns and operates the ferry. On paper, NYC had very tough safety rules, requiring two pilots to be in the pilothouse at all times, just in case; however, it turns out that this rule was not always followed.
On Monday, this abundance of caution came back to bite the city; a federal judge hearing the case held that the existence of these rules could actually be a factor in its liability (NYT):
The city had also argued that because its two-pilot rule was stricter than required by general negligence principles, the violation of the rule did not constitute negligence. In any case, the city said, individual crew members, not the city, were at fault.
But the judge, Edward R. Korman of United States District Court in Brooklyn, rejected those arguments. He wrote that by adopting the two-pilot rule, the city acknowledged a serious risk of accident if the pilot were incapacitated, and that knowledge of that risk required the city to remedy it.
In other words, the fact that at one point in time someone who worked for the city was extra-cautious actually works against the city; as soon as someone put down an idea about safety on paper, it became a minimum requirement rather than an option. (Trial lawyers already routinely use the existence of internal safety deliberations at a corporation as proof that a corporation knew about and ignored particular risks.) So what lesson do we send? Don’t adopt any rules beyond the absolute bare minimum; certainly, don’t put anything beyond this on paper.
(The judge naively pooh-poohed this risk, arguing that a “rational company” would be “far more concerned with actually preventing accidents than with gaming future negligence actions by carefully crafting its safety manual,” as if a company knew beforehand which accidents were “actually” going to happen.)
N.B.: I should clarify that the city may actually have been negligent in this particular instance; I’m critiquing the principle the judge espouses, rather than its application here.
Immunity – up to a point
Walter stole my thunder on the dismissal of the blog comment lawsuit against Lycos, but I thought it raised an important point. One of the common refrains of the Trial Lawyer crowd is that tort reform is not needed, because there are already mechanisms for the courts to deal with frivolous litigation, and because contingency fees mean that plaintiff’s lawyers have no incentive to take on meritless cases. The theory of tort reformers, on the other hand, is that the lottery nature of litigation means that plaintiff’s attorneys can take on long shot cases, because they only need to win a handful of “deep pockets” suits to come out ahead.
Which theory best explains lawsuits like this one? It’s difficult for Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to be much clearer. It grants (as the First Circuit noted) “broad immunity to entities, such as Lycos, that facilitate the speech of others on the Internet.” This isn’t controversial; the First Circuit described its decision as “joining the other courts that have uniformly given effect to Section 230 in similar circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) So why would the plaintiffs not only sue on such a meritless theory, but actually appeal after losing in the District Court?
(I should note that I don’t have any specific evidence that this was a contingency case; nonetheless, the larger issue — namely, how can we successfully disincentivize plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing meritless suits — remains. Immunity from liability is great — but it isn’t the same as immunity from litigation. Lycos won this suit — twice — but how much did these victories cost?)
UPDATE: I had forgotten that the plaintiffs in this case, UCS and its CEO, Michael Zwebner, and their lawyer, John Faro, are no strangers to Overlawyered; they’re the same folks who sued Wolf Blitzer because of posts on Lycos’s message board from an anonymous poster who used the screen name Wolfblitzzer0. (See also updates on March 12, 2005; October 15, 2005).
Update: $875K award to ejected slots player
We reported Jul. 25 and Aug. 4, 2003 on the case of Stella (or Estella; accounts vary) Romanski, who was banished from the Motor City Casino in Detroit after taking and playing a nickel from an unattended slot machine. The casino said it was enforcing a policy against “slot walking”, the practice of roaming unused machines in search of overlooked coins, but a jury awarded Romanski $875,000 in punitive damages. Reader F.L. now calls our attention to the record (PDF) of U.S. Supreme Court actions taken Oct. 2, 2006, which shows that the high court denied the writ of certiorari sought by the casino.
Blogs not liable for their commenters
But if anyone was wondering, that still doesn’t mean we’re going to let anything and everything pass in the comments section here. (American Constitution Society Blog, Feb. 26 (via GruntDoc); Reynolds, Feb. 26) (Universal Communication Systems v. Lycos).
Experian class action settlement
Attorney Donald Caster writes from Cincinnati:
OK, I’ll admit it: I’m a “trial lawyer,” and I usually disagree with Overlawyered’s point of view. (In fact, usually when I read the blog, I’m thinking about what a great job a particular lawyer did to get the result that you’re now protesting.) But I get nearly as agitated as you folks do over the abusiveness of coupon settlements in class action cases, and I just got notice of such a settlement myself.
Below I’ve cut and pasted the exact text of the email message I received notifying me of the settlement. The class action has its own website at www.browningsettlement.com. As you can see, the defendant is Experian, and the plaintiffs claim that they made some sort of representations on a website that violated the “Credit Repair Organizations Act.”
Class counsel is set to take over $2.5 million in fees. The “benefit” to the class? A settlement in which class members get either (a) a free credit score, or (b) free credit monitoring for two months. And oh, by the way, if you take the latter option, you have to remember to cancel the monitoring, or you’ll automatically start getting billed $9.95/month for credit monitoring after sixty days. That reeks of a lack of arms-length negotiation between class counsel and the defendant (what a great deal for the defendant–they get new customers in exchange for settling a class action lawsuit!).
The Great Escape
Pop quiz: the police try to pull over a car, and the driver, instead of slowing down, flees at high speed. The police should (A) Let him go; (B) Keep chasing him, and pray that he doesn’t kill anybody; or (C) Try to physically stop him by bumping his car with theirs.
Okay, here’s the real pop quiz: which of those will not result in taxpayers getting the shaft and trial lawyers making out like bandits? We know from experience that the answer is not (B). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments (PDF) on Monday in a case entitled Scott v. Harris to decide whether (C) is a viable option.
Harris was a 19-year old driver in Georgia who was doing 73 in a 55 MPH zone; when police tried to pull him over, he sped up and tried to escape, reaching at least 90 miles per hour on a two-lane road. Police officer Scott joined the chase, and after Harris drove recklessly for about 10 minutes, running red lights and weaving through traffic on the wrong side of the road, Scott bumped his car to stop him. Unfortunately, Harris lost control, crashed, and was rendered a quadriplegic. A sad ending for Harris, to be sure — but in a sane world, his fault. In our world, of course, he immediately sued Scott for violating his fourth amendment right not to be “unreasonably” seized.
Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, Orin Kerr, who co-represented Scott on appeal, has been blogging about the case. (Technically, the Supreme Court is addressing the narrower question of whether Scott is entitled to qualified immunity — but as any Overlawyered reader knows, lawsuits are crapshoots; if immunity is denied and Scott is forced to go to trial, the case will probably settle so that Harris can’t win the lottery from a befuddled jury.)
If the Supreme Court rules for the driver — though oral arguments didn’t seem to be in his favor — then trial lawyers will have successfully created a no-win scenario for police; criminals will be free to flee without fear of police pursuit. Maybe it’s just me, but that would seem to be a strange incentive: criminals who surrender peacefully go to jail, and those who refuse to submit are rewarded with cash or freedom.
- Related to this story, a reader (okay, Ted Frank) passes along another police chase lawsuit story which is (predictably) “Not about the money”: parents collect quarter-million-plus for kids’ deaths fleeing high-speed police chase [Robesonian Online]