There are lots of them tucked into the bill, and they will probably come at a significant cost for companies in the economy’s financial sector, as I explain in a new post at Cato at Liberty (earlier; more on qui tam and whistleblower matters more generally).
5 Comments
Yes, making sure there are no disencentives for reporting crimes is bad.
If this is bad, then, perhaps, so are plea bargains that give more lenient sentences for cooperating with the authorities.
I would like to see you come up with a system that protects the public from wrongdoing and protects those who report the wrongdoing, while at the same time does not enrich the plaintiff’s bar. When you find it, I shall sign on.
It all comes down to the question of lesser evils. Either corporations are allowed to keep ill-gotten gains or some corporations who have done nothing wrong will have to bear some of the cost of enforcement.
Counting on Chris Dodd to “clean up” the Financial Services sector is so unrealistic it’s breathtaking.
Oh well, another one for the “repeal” program…
[…] society that “encourages people to be disloyal to their friends and co-workers.” Earlier here and here. Other coverage of the whistleblowing provisions: Coyle/NLJ, Koehler/FCPA Professor, […]
Yes, making sure there are no disencentives for reporting crimes is bad.
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Yeah, because there’s no way to avoid the disincentives other a multi-million dollar lottery. People would be stupid not to plot against their employers at this point.
[…] first rather than relying on internal disclosure mechanisms.” [NYT "DealBook", earlier here, here, […]