Last night I mentioned some of the difficulties in trying to justify racial profiling on the grounds of efficient policing. I just wanted to add a few more comments. First, in my paper with Mike Alexeev, our generally anti-profiling “results” apply to situations where the probability of being stopped is relatively low, as it is in standard highway enforcement. If the police can stop a substantial proportion of folks (a’ la airport screening), then our results are not applicable. Second, choosing whom to stop is the first stage, but as or more important is the next stage, how those who are stopped are treated. Is the stop limited in time and intrusiveness? (Here’s one way not to treat people.) Further, is the goal that ostensibly is being served actually benefiting from the profiling? In a fine paper that looks very closely at Maryland’s I-95 stops, Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes attack Maryland’s stop-and-search policy partly on the grounds that it accomplishes essentially nothing in impeding the flow of drugs to Baltimore and Washington, DC. Third, I am almost ashamed to admit that my own views on racial profiling changed a bit when I found myself to be a “profilee.” (I briefly recounted the tale during an earlier guest-blogging appearance at Crescat Sententia — oh no, I don’t want to develop a reputation as someone who blogs around!) Funny how it is easier to suport a policy (our drug war comes to mind) when you are pretty sure that you and yours will not bear the costs of it.
More on Racial Profiling
Last night I mentioned some of the difficulties in trying to justify racial profiling on the grounds of efficient policing. I just wanted to add a few more comments. First, in my paper with Mike Alexeev, our generally anti-profiling “results” apply to situations where the probability of being stopped is relatively low, as it is […]
Comments are closed.