OK, I am feeling a little guilty that during my week of guest blogging I didn’t really focus on core Overlawyered topics. To make partial amends, let me ask a couple of questions drawn from the intersection of Overlawyered’s and Vice Squad’s areas of interest. Should drug users be held responsible for their decisions to use drugs? Should addicts be held accountable for other criminal acts that are undertaken either under the influence of drugs, or to serve the needs of drug acquisition? If addiction is a disease, shouldn’t addicts be excused for their habits or for their actions, even otherwise criminal actions, that flow from their addictions?
With respect to serious crimes, the law agrees with our general intuition: a condition of intoxication or addiction is not an excuse for criminal behavior. Nevertheless, many people are willing to be indulgent of less serious social indiscretions if the perpetrator “had a bit too much to drink.” Chronic addicts, however, often become unsympathetic characters — even compassionate social workers find themselves “blaming the victim” (the client or patient) when they deal extensively with junkies.
Many treatment programs, including Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, and Gamblers Anonymous, explicitly adopt a disease perspective towards their respective addictions. Nevertheless, these programs do not absolve the addict of responsibility for his or her behavior — quite the contrary, they emphasize personal accountability. Even if biological conditions make drug use a nearly overwhelming necessity for some addicts, it is the drug use which is the necessity — not bank robbery or car theft or other crimes. And generally even the drug use will be deterred if a police officer is standing over their shoulder.
Incidentally, in the mid-1960s it looked as if the US Supreme Court might make the status of addiction an excuse for some sorts of crimes. This impression was squelched via the 1968 case of Powell v. Texas.
According to the arresting officer, Leroy Powell was walking down a public street in Austin, Texas, staggering as he walked, and smelling of alcohol. Powell was convicted of being “found in a state of intoxication,” and the conviction was upheld (and the fine doubled, to $40) upon appeal to the Travis County Court. This 1966 arrest itself was far from an isolated incident for Mr. Powell, who estimated that he had been arrested about one hundred times in similar circumstances in the past. The Travis County Court issued findings of fact submitted by Powell’s defense team. These included the claims that Powell suffered from the disease of chronic alcoholism, which undermined his ability to resist drinking, and made his choice to appear in public in an intoxicated state one taken under the compulsion of the disease. The Travis County Court did not find that these “facts” constituted a defense to the charge of public intoxication.
The Supreme Court upheld Mr. Powell’s conviction on a 5-4 vote, though in their preliminary deliberations the justices apparently split 5-4 in favor of overturning the conviction. Four separate opinions were filed, with no opinion for the Court. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion for himself and three other justices who voted with the majority. Marshall noted that Mr. Powell was not convicted because he was an alcoholic, but because of his public behavior, which both created hazards and offended sensibilities. Thus, Mr. Powell’s sentence was not a “cruel and unusual” punishment, which would be precluded by the Eighth Amendment. Justice Byron White also voted to uphold the conviction, but added a separate opinion, in which he noted that there was no evidence that Mr. Powell was unable, because of his condition of alcoholism, to remain off of the streets — in other words, Powell’s condition had not put his actions beyond his control.
Besides the case itself, this description of Powell v. Texas relies upon David Robinson, Jr., “Powell v. Texas: The Case of the Intoxicated Shoeshine Man. Some Reflections a Generation Later By a Participant.” American Journal of Criminal Law 26 (401), Summer, 1999.
Comments are closed.