More on the juror and the newspaper

We get mail: I read your post about the juror who was caught buying a newspaper during a murder trial with interest because my brother, William Boge, was one of the defense attorneys. While I agree that simply buying a newspaper when instructed not to by the judge (especially if the trial isn’t covered in […]

We get mail:

I read your post about the juror who was caught buying a newspaper during a murder trial with interest because my brother, William Boge, was one of the defense attorneys.

While I agree that simply buying a newspaper when instructed not to by the judge (especially if the trial isn’t covered in that paper) is not necessarily grounds for an automatic mistrial, I think there were some important points left out of this discussion that makes the mistrial more reasonable.

First, the juror bought two newspapers, not one. And it’s reasonable to assume if she bought newspapers that day, she probably bought them other days as well. And one of the papers she bought (the Potomac News) was a local one, and covered many aspects of the trial, including information NOT allowed to be presented at the trial. So, who’s to say she didn’t read the papers on those days, too?

Second, because it was the defense attorney (John Shields) who accused her of buying the paper (and the Judge asked her directly if she had seen Shields at the 7-11 that morning), she would understandably hold some anger against him, which could impair her ability to make a fair decision in the case.

Finally, this case was entirely circumstantial. There was not one piece of evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Based on this, my guess is that the judge was very hesitant to let stand a murder conviction and a 40-year prison term, based solely on circumstantial evidence, if there was any doubt that the jury had been influenced by outside evidence.

Regards,
Matt Boge

The first point is certainly a valid argument. If the judge made a finding that the juror was prejudiced from reading newspapers other than the ones seen being bought, that could be grounds for a mistrial. We don’t know from the press accounts whether the judge actually made this finding, which was certainly possible: on April 12, the Potomac News reported about an inadmissible affidavit Marissa Lara made before her murder where she accused her estranged husband of raping and threatening to kill her. But why not question the other jurors to determine if Lindy Heaster had reported this information in deliberations?

I don’t find the second argument persuasive. If this were a legitimate reason to find prejudice, an attorney could deliberately try to alienate jurors and then complain that the juror might wish to retaliate. If it were possible for the judge to do so (and it may not have been), Judge Alston should have taken steps to quiz the juror about the 7-11 purchase without letting it be known who saw the juror.

Nearly every murder case involves solely “circumstantial evidence,” which just means non-eyewitness testimony. And the circumstantial evidence here was strong: Gerardo Lara had the motive to kill his estranged wife; Lara had previously violently attacked her (and someone trying to rescue her) in a different incident in front of witnesses; Lara was caught trying to get his sons to lie about an alibi; the victim’s body was found in a Mitsubishi, wrapped in a sleeping bag resembling that of one of Lara’s sons, and both sets of the keys to the Mitsubishi were found in Lara’s home–including a set in a briefcase hidden underneath the bed. All of that would be sufficient evidence to convict Gerardo Lara of murder even if one completely discounts the jailhouse confession he allegedly made.

Other readers have asked whether the judge has the power to issue a $30,000 civil contempt fine to compensate for the costs of the mistrial. The contempt proceeding on July 1 would probably have to be a criminal contempt proceeding, though, if so, it contradicts the press account stating that the judge has already held Heaster in contempt. The proposed fine is likely substantial enough to entitle Heaster to a jury trial; Virginia law has in a similar case limited civil contempt fines to $50. Brown v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 758, 497 S.E.2d 147 (1998). But all of this remains to be litigated, and, if I were the juror, I would probably be more concerned about the possible felony perjury charges the peeved prosecutor is likely to bring.

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