Posts Tagged ‘crime and punishment’

Newspaper purchase costs juror over $30k

Gerardo N. Lara was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder in the stabbing of his wife, Marissa Lara. But the defense attorney saw one of the jurors buying a newspaper during the trial; at a mistrial hearing, the juror, Lindy L. Heaster, denied the purchase, but a videotape from the 7-11 proved otherwise, and the judge threw out the verdict. Heaster’s been held in contempt for violating the court’s orders to disregard press coverage and lying to the court, and could be socked with the costs of the trial.

While the juror certainly committed contempt and (from the news reports) seems to have committed perjury, I wonder if the mistrial remedy for the defendant is a bit extreme. The April 15 Washington Post Heaster bought had no coverage of the trial. And if Heaster read the April 15 Potomac News coverage of the trial, the only thing she learned was that an argument the defense wanted to make that the judge refused to tell the jury. Should the law recognize the potential for harmless error here? I’ve turned on comments; please keep discussion civil and limited to this topic. (Tara Young, “Indiscretion Gets Juror In Trouble”, Washington Post, Apr. 22; Maria Hegstad, “Judge declares mistrial in Lara case”, Potomac News, Apr. 21; Tara Young, “N.Va. Murder Conviction Erased by Juror Buying Newspaper”, Potomac News, Apr. 21; Rob Seal, “Lara found guilty”, Potomac News, Apr. 16). More discussion: Apr. 25 post.

Read On…

“The CSI Effect”

A disappointed jury can be a dangerous thing. Just ask Jodi Hoos. Prosecuting a gang member in Peoria, Ill., for raping a teenager in a local park last year, Hoos told the jury, “You’ve all seen CSI. Well, this is your CSI moment. We have DNA.” Specifically, investigators had matched saliva on the victim’s breast to the defendant, who had denied touching her. The jury also had gripping testimony from the victim, an emergency-room nurse, and the responding officers. When the jury came back, however, the verdict was not guilty. Why? Unmoved by the DNA evidence, jurors felt police should have tested “debris” found in the victim to see if it matched soil from the park. “They said they knew from CSI that police could test for that sort of thing,” Hoos said. “We had his DNA. We had his denial. It’s ridiculous.”

Television’s diet of forensic fantasy “projects the image that all cases are solvable by highly technical science, and if you offer less than that, it is viewed as reasonable doubt,” says Hoos’s boss, Peoria State’s Attorney Kevin Lyons. “The burden it places on us is overwhelming.” Prosecutors have a name for the phenomenon: “the CSI effect.”

On the other side of the coin, there are prosecutors who use junk science from quacks who claim to be using forensics, such as Sandra Anderson, who regularly faked evidence for her “forensic dog” business. (Kit R. Roane and Dan Morrison, US News & World Report, Apr. 25) (via Volokh and PrawfsBlawg).

Parking under the influence

Under Alabama law, if you’ve had too much to drink and decide to sleep it off in your parked car, officers can and do arrest you for DUI, no matter that the keys never left your pocket. A sheriff explains that, after all, the inebriate might wake up and decide to start up the car, so it’s better to make an arrest (which carries a penalty for a first offense that includes loss of license) before that can happen (“Drunks Arrested For Parking Under the Influence”, WAFF Huntsville, Apr. 13; Sheryl Marsh, Decatur Daily, Apr. 12) (via Balko who got it from DUIblog, who has more).

Batch of reader letters

We’ve just added four more entries to our stack of reader correspondence, which constitutes its own page with a blog-like format. Among topics this time are high-speed cop chases; a reader asks equal time to bash defense lawyers; step right up and grab your class action prizes, advises a garish GoogleAd; and a family’s pipe and valve distribution business gets caught in the asbestos-litigation snare.

Bible ploy backfires

25-year-old Rhonda Maloney’s car was stuck in the snow early one February morning. Robert Harlan stopped, but not to help: he admittedly raped Maloney. Maloney escaped Harlan’s vehicle and flagged down a passing motorist, Jaquie Creazzo. Harlan responded to Creazzo’s rescue attempt by chasing after her, shooting her three times just outside the Thornton, Colorado police station, paralyzing her in the process. Harlan escaped; Maloney’s body, beaten and shot, was found seven days later. DNA and fingerprint evidence led to Harlan, who conceded the act in his trial, but sought to blame it on drugs. Nevertheless, a jury convicted him of first-degree murder.

At the penalty hearing, two women testified that Harlan had sexually assaulted them, as well. The jury was then instructed by the judge, as per Colorado law at the time, to make an “individual moral assessment” in deciding whether Harlan should receive a life sentence or the death penalty. (As a wise judge once noted to me, the judicial system cannot decide whether someone will die, but only when.)

In the closing arguments, Harlan’s attorneys invoked the Bible, and G-d’s mercy on Abraham, and asked the jury to impose a life sentence. With these instructions, some of the jurors allegedly consulted the Bible itself, and one juror says that a few considered the relevant provisions in Leviticus that countenanced a death sentence for murder. Eight years after the trial, the jurors were dragged in front of the court to testify; several jurors denied seeing a Bible in the jury room, but the judge resolved the disagreement by finding that the jurors did consult the Bible. By a 3-2 vote the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The death sentence was revoked, and a life sentence without parole was given.

Tough question: we probably don’t want Leviticus to be the law of the land. The pork lobby would never countenance Leviticus 11:7-8. On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that it would’ve been appropriate for a juror to speak the phrase “eye for an eye” in the course of argument during deliberations. And, indeed, during the voir dire, Harlan’s attorney asked one of the jurors about his feeling about that maxim. If jurors can be trusted with following the law in the face of an oral discussion, why does the written word have such power to cloud jurors’ minds? The precedent won’t matter much: Colorado changed its law in 1999 to have judges determine death sentences, though, of course, Ring v. Arizona put the jury back in charge of the decision. It seems a hair was split awfully thin to overturn a death sentence. The dissent seems to have the better of of the argument. (People v. Harlan (Colo. Mar. 28, 2005)); People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo. 2000); Kirk Johnson, “Colorado Court Bars Execution Because Jurors Consulted Bible”, NY Times, Mar. 29; History Channel documentary; “Murderers’ Row”, Westword, Jun. 7, 2001; Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar press release, Jun. 24, 2002). The Coloradoans Against the Death Penalty page on the case has additional links. Why didn’t the Court let a new jury resolve the question instead of simply impose a life sentence? I don’t know the answer to that.

Side trivia note: in November 2001, Justin Goetz, armed with three firearms, set the Creazzo family’s car on fire and threatened to shoot his ex-girlfriend, Creazzo’s daughter–but the paralyzed Creazzo defended herself by shooting Goetz first. (Sue Lindsay, “Man sentenced in bid to gun down good Samaritan (17 years in slay attempt)”, Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 3, 2002; AWARE page on Creazzo).

Today’s police chase lawsuit round-up II

So, you’re a police officer and you see a Nissan truck zoom through a stop sign at 40 mph. You give chase, but the car speeds up and drives even more erratically. Do you:

(a) View this as a sign that this maniac driver must be stopped?

or

(b) Stop the chase. The guy is driving dangerously!

Lawsuit after lawsuit posit that police act inappropriately by not stopping the chase — even though that effectively creates a policy that rewards, and thus encourages, miscreants who put other drivers at risk by trying to escape the police. Simply put, policy (b) is the policy that will guarantee that drivers try to drive dangerously to force police to peel off, while policy (a) encourages all but the most wildly irrational to pull over.

In California on March 16, 2003, Joseph Boldt, allegedly under the influence of meth, sped up in his stolen vehicle after running the stop sign, and Sergeant Mark Farber followed. Boldt decided to try to escape by going southbound in the northbound lanes of I-280, at speeds of up to 110 mph, causing three other accidents before smashing into an innocent driver, Girish Wadhwani, critically injuring him. Boldt’s passenger, Bobby Luke Kleinheinz, also wanted on an arrest warrant at the time, wasn’t wearing his seatbelt and was killed; the wheelchair-bound Boldt faces second-degree murder charges, though his trial has been postponed at least a couple of times because of crash-related health problems. Kleinheinz’s family is, of course, suing the police, rather than Boldt. The Association of Bay Area Governments paid Wadhwani $3.15 million for his broken bones. “Millbrae officials said they believed Farber acted appropriately but agreed to the settlement for fear of losing an even larger award during a civil trial.” (Ryan Kim, “$3.15 million settlement in high-speed crash”, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 26; AP, Mar. 26; Amy Yarbrough, “Man awarded $3.15 million in damages after police chase”, San Mateo County Times, Mar. 19; “Crash trial postponed”, SF Examiner, Sep. 14; Ethan Fletcher, “Chase case heads for trial”, San Francisco Independent, Jul. 23; Michelle Durand, “Fatal wrong-way driver begins murder trial today”, San Mateo Daily Journal, Jun. 8; Michelle Durand, “Murder trial delayed for fatal wrong way driver”, Dec. 24, 2003; WPIX-5, Mar. 19, 2003; previous OL posts on high-speed chases: Mar. 15 & Sep. 21, 2003)(& letter to the editor, Apr. 12).

Wrong, with vengeance

My friend Eugene Volokh writes sensibly about nearly every other topic in the world, but yesterday revealed an inexplicable blind spot (Mar. 16) on some basic issues of crime and punishment. John Cole, Jonathan Wilde, Road to Surfdom, and Maimon Schwarzschild, among others, endeavor to set him straight (more trackbacks). Also see Jeff Jacoby, “Where’s the outrage on torture?”, Boston Globe, Mar. 15. More: he now says he’s been persuaded to change his view by Mark Kleiman’s post here, and Kleiman comments in turn.

Atlanta courthouse shootings

Over on Point of Law, I have a short piece on the small contribution employment law developments made to Brian Nichols’s escape and resulting murder of three or four people. Michelle Malkin’s readers debate the issue. Certainly, there were other contibuting farcical errors, including a weak prosecution that resulted in a mistrial the first time Nichols’s rape count was tried, the shocking underreaction to Nichols trying to smuggle shanks into the courtroom, nobody monitoring the cameras that showed Nichols overpowering Cynthia Hill, and police overlooking for thirteen hours that a Honda thought to be an escape vehicle was still in the garage where it had supposedly been carjacked.

Rest assured, though, that the Fulton County judicial system appears to have at least as many snafus as its security system:

Read On…

Today’s police chase lawsuit round-up

In Connecticut, the town of Norwalk is paying $1.5 million in a settlement with pedestrians hit by a drunk driver fleeing police. Plaintiffs had sought millions. “[Julia] Johnson’s estate sought additional compensation for her death from cancer in August 2001. The estate argued that Johnson’s injuries caused her to miss a scheduled mammogram that would have caught the cancer in its early stages.” The settlement seems to be a “moral hazard” artifact of the insurance policy, which covered negligence, but not recklessness; the judge had ruled the city couldn’t be held liable for negligence, and the city worried that a jury sympathizing with the plaintiffs would’ve simply found the quantum of recklessness needed so they could award damages. This is a useful example about the inefficacy of immunity statutes that protect against “negligence” but not “gross negligence.” (Brian Lockhart, “City pays $1.5M to settle suit with hurt pedestrians”, Stamford Advocate, Mar. 14). Unrelatedly, Norwalk is also the defendant in a suit by Linda Gorman. Gorman took a job in the town clerk’s office , interacting with the general public, but complains that the town isn’t doing enough to deal with her sensitivity to fragrances and perfumes. (Brian Lockhart, “Norwalk City Hall employee files lawsuit over perfume”, Stamford Advocate, Mar. 1).

Thousands of miles away, a jury found Hawaii County 34% responsible for the death of Ellison Sweezey, who was killed when Richard Rosario, a 20-year-old crystal meth addict fleeing police, ran a red light and struck her car. Cost to taxpayers: $1.9 million. If there were joint and several liability, the county would also be on the hook for Rosario’s share. (Rod Thompson, “Jury awards $5.6M in death from car chase”, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Mar. 9; “$5.6M awarded to family of Big Island crash victim”, Honolulu Advertiser, Mar. 9). Hawaii police have undergone training to limit their willingness to chase suspects, with the expected counterproductive result (which we discussed Sep. 21, 2003) that criminals are now more likely to flee because their chances of escape have increased. (Rod Thompson, “Car theft suspect flees after slow-speed pursuit”, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Mar. 10). Other car-chase lawsuits: Jan. 3; Feb. 18, 2004 (& letter to the editor, Apr. 12).

Library molester case: Ladell Alexander v. DBS Security

Pro se prisoner litigation isn’t the biggest problem facing society, but the case of Ladell Alexander is impressive in its chutzpah. Alexander molested a little boy in a St. Joseph County, Indiana library, and was convicted of the crime. Judge Sharp threw out Alexander’s lawsuit against the library security company for not doing enough to stop him, making the obvious point “Though every decent and moral person wishes that he had been prevented from committing this hideous crime, no one owes Mr. Alexander anything for having not done so.” (“Molester tries to sue those who didn’t stop him”, South Bend Tribune, Dec. 9 ($); LibraryLaw Blog reprint of Alexander v. DBS Security, No. 3:04-CV-703 AS (N.D. Ind.)).