Posts Tagged ‘ethics’

Asbestos litigation: background

I’m happy to see that my initial post — which doesn’t really include any details of yet — has already begun to spark debate in the comments. I have thoughts on the views expressed, but I’ll begin with some background. This information might be old hat to those familiar with the asbestos mess, but it’s essential for those with little knowledge. This summary largely follows the account from the introduction to our Trial Lawyers, Inc.: Asbestos report.

Asbestos manufacturing in the United States was ubiquitous. At one point, asbestos-related industries employed as many as 2.5 million Americans. Asbestos commercial mining began in the U.S. in 1874, and after the Johns-Manville corporation was founded in 1890 with a patent for a process that blended short asbestos fibers with magnesia, asbestos manufacturing exploded: “asbestos consumption went from only 956 metric tons in 1890 to a peak of 803,000 tons in 1973.”

While asbestos ultimately proved deadly, it was originally thought to be a “magic mineral,” as it was dubbed at the 1939 World’s Fair. The word asbestos itself is derived from the Greek for “indestructible,” and the product is an incomparable flame retardant: it insulated generations of schoolchildren from fire and indeed fireproofed our World War II Pacific fleet.

But asbestos has also long been known to be dangerous when inhaled–as far back, perhaps, as the days of Pliny the Elder. In the early 20th century, asbestos was deemed as dangerous as lead and mercury (two products that have themselves spawned much litigation). In 1918, the U.S. Department of Labor declared that there was an “urgent need for more qualified extensive investigation” into the harms of asbestos, and in 1938, the U.S. Public Health Service issued a “good-practice” guideline for Threshold Limit Values of asbestos exposure.

Thus, asbestos was known publicly to be dangerous when virtually everyone suffering from asbestos-related illness was exposed. The extent of the danger, however, was not known definitively until 1964, when a seminal study by Mount Sinai Hospital’s Irving Selikoff established a definitive link between asbestos exposure and lung cancers and asbestosis.

Subsequently, evidence indicated that asbestos manufacturing companies knew more about asbestos’ dangers than they originally let on, and indeed in some cases hid that information from the public. Still, as my colleague Peter Huber pointed out in his review of Paul Brodeur’s Outrageous Misconduct, a much-cited book that harshly criticizes the asbestos industry, the asbestos companies’ early knowledge about asbestosis–asbestos-related lung injury that is rarely fatal, and was generally known–should not be confused with knowledge of the deadly lung cancer mesothelioma, which was exposed by the Selikoff study: “In his account of who knew what when–the core of his cover-up theory–Brodeur systematically obscures the difference between asbestos-related cancer and asbestosis, usually a much less serious disease, and understood and discussed in the Manville boardrooms much earlier.”

In any event, the original asbestos manufacturers like Johns-Manville have long been bankrupt due to litigation exposure. (Johns-Manville, ranked 181 on the Fortune 500 with over $2.2 billion in sales, declared bankrupcty in 1982 due to its looming caseload of 16,500 cases, and projections of up to 200,000 in the future.) The story of how that litigation evolved will be the subject of my next post.

Excited to be here to talk about asbestos

I can’t say how excited I am to be here as a guest at overlawyered — the first legal blog still in existence! I’ll never be the indefatigable blogger that is my colleague Walter, or my friend and fellow legal reformer Ted, but I jumped at the opportunity to come over here to Mr. Olson’s “other” blog (he and Ted are also the mainstays of the Manhattan Institute’s PointofLaw.com, to which I occasionally contribute).

Overlawyered’s long-time readers have doubtless read a lot about asbestos. And we’ve covered asbestos litigation very extensively over at Point of Law. But there’s a lot of new material in the Manhattan Institute’s just-released Trial Lawyers, Inc.: Asbestos, as well as a lot of background for those new to the subject. Over the next week, I’ll be going through both.

I’d urge anyone interested to read the entire report, available here. Those who want a quicker review of some of the newer material should read my column in the Washington Examiner, which ran yesterday. And there’s a good overview of my thoughts in an on-line interview available here.

I’ll be back shortly to begin my walk-through of the report, looking at the underpinnings of the trial lawyers’ big asbestos machine.

Don’t X

Another bunch of things not to do if you’re a member of the legal profession.

  • Send insulting letters to opposing counsel. (G.F. Pignato, ordered to write an article about civility.) [Legal Profession Blog via ABA Journal]
  • Leave your innocent client in jail by failing to act on new evidence. (William S. Gebbie, surrenders his California license; also accused of stealing client funds.) [ABA Journal]
  • Use the NY Yankees trademark without permission in advertising for asbestos clients. [ATL]
  • Make “jerk-off” motions in court. (Adam Reposa, Texas, sentenced to ninety days for contempt of court; many in blogosphere are appalled at what they call an overreaction.) [ATL; Simple Justice; Mark Bennett and again; and Patterico notes an interesting coincidence]
  • Mock the plaintiffs’ attorney at a jury trial with “Overruled” signs and soccer-style red cards. (Judge James M. Brooks, admonished.) [ATL]
  • As a prosecutor, conceal exculpatory evidence. (Former Sonoma County Deputy District Attorney Brooke Halsey Jr., suspended.) [ABA Journal]
  • And even if you’re a pro se, don’t send a death threat to opposing counsel by fax. [Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel]

Earlier: Feb. 24.

Plaintiff: my lawyers cut unfair side deal with Prudential

The law firm of Leeds Morelli & Brown has recently been embroiled in controversy over episodes in which it has settled batches of employment discrimination claims while contemporaneously entering agreements in which the defendants agree to hire it (the Leeds Morelli firm) for substantial sums. Now an African-American woman who was once a vice president at Prudential Insurance and then sued the company for racial bias as a Leeds Morelli client “is asking a federal judge to set aside an arbitration award, alleging her lawyers were given improper financial inducement to keep her claim and hundreds of others out of court. According to Linda Guyden, the company paid $5 million to the law firm representing her and 358 other employees, in return for which Prudential’s total exposure was capped at $10 million and the claims were kept secret just as the company was about to be taken public.” (Mary Pat Gallagher, “Bias Plaintiff Says Lawyer Sell-Out Warrants Vacating of Arbitration”, New Jersey Law Journal, Apr. 8). For a cognate controversy over Leeds Morelli’s settlement of employment claims with Nextel Corp., see Leigh Jones, “Columbia’s Simon Blasts Professors’ Role in Nextel Bias Case”, National Law Journal, Nov. 26; Bluestone, New York Attorney Malpractice Blog, Feb. 12, 2007.

NY Times on Ground Zero dust lawyer

In Sunday’s Times reporter Anthony DePalma takes a much-needed look at attorney Paul Napoli and his Napoli Bern law firm, which is now representing thousands of plaintiffs claiming injury from 9/11 dust inhalation and before that made its name in the fen-phen litigation. Among the controversies that have trailed it to the present day from that affair: charges that it divvied up settlements in a way favorable to its own fee interests, and that it used unreliable “echo mill” expert reports from echocardiologists attesting injury to fen-phen claimants. Prof. Lester Brickman, friend of this site, is quoted extensively. See our extensive earlier coverage at Overlawyered: Dec. 16, 2002, Sept. 21, 2003, etc. (echo mills); Dec. 28, 2001, Feb. 14, 2005, and Mar. 29, 2007 (settlement practices); Feb. 25, 2008 (broad net cast in 9/11 suits)(cross-posted from Point of Law).

Ethically failing upward in Alabama, cont’d

Updating our Jan. 6, 2007 post: “The Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that a county judge accused of ethical wrongdoing before he became a judge cannot be disciplined by the state bar until he leaves the bench. A dissenter claimed the majority opinion leads to ‘absurd consequences’ and gives the judge, Stuart DuBose, ‘unwarranted immunity.'” Voters elevated DuBose to a circuit judgeship despite his publicized role “in an estate in which he collected a $1.2 million fee for writing a client’s will without ever meeting the dying man,” to quote our earlier post. (Debra Cassens Weiss, “Facing State Bar Ethics Charges in Alabama? Become a Judge”, Mar. 20).

N.H. jury: lawyer’s demand letters amounted to extortion

Now this could crimp the business plans of quite a few attorneys:

A Manchester lawyer who threatened to sue a Concord salon for pricing haircuts differently for men and women and then took money to settle the matter was found guilty of theft by extortion.

A jury took about 1½ hours to convict Daniel Hynes, 27, on Wednesday. Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth Baker said Hynes sent letters to at least 19 salons in the state.

One arrived Dec. 20, 2006, at Claudia’s, the North Main Street hair salon owned by Claudia Lambert. In the letter, Hynes said prices should be based on the time a cut takes or on the length of hair, instead of on gender. He wrote: “I demand payment in the amount of $1,000 in order to avoid litigation,” according to court documents. …

Hynes said yesterday that he plans to appeal.

“The conviction goes against the First Amendment,” he said. “People have a right to petition the courts. In my case, I wanted to address my concern with the Human Rights Commission.”

Asked why he sent letters to salons instead of contacting the commission directly, Hynes said lawyers often settle out of court.

“I believe it’s more appropriate to attempt as amicable a resolution as possible,” he said.

… In one court document, he argued that the price structure that he saw as discriminatory had caused him stress and mental anguish, despite the fact that prices for men were less than those for women. He said he was being denied an “inherent benefit in being treated equally.”

(Chelsea Conaboy, “Lawyer guilty of salon extortion”, Concord Monitor, Mar. 21; Greenfield, Mar. 23; Above the Law, Mar. 25; Pasquale, Concurring Opinions, Mar. 24).

Prof. Bainbridge (Mar. 25) cites California’s experience with the now somewhat reformed s. 17200 unfair business practices law, which empowered freelancing lawyers to send out demand letters to businesses over a wide variety of alleged infractions. He concludes that the answer is to amend underlying laws which sweep too broadly in banning business practices, authorize damage claims unrelated to actual injury, and so forth. Although I much appreciate the kind suggestions for further reading he offers in his post, I can’t say I entirely go along with the idea that the scope for possible abuse would vanish if only the underlying laws were written properly. At Concurring Opinions, incidentally, one commenter draws a connection to RIAA’s mass production of demand letters against file-sharers, while another warns that for a target to complain to the authorities of extortion, as did the New Hampshire salon owner, might itself be construed by many courts as “retaliation” against the filer of a discrimination claim and thus as grounds for penalties on its own.

“My client is being framed”, cont’d

Our weekend post questioning defense attorney John Keker’s assertions of the innocence of client Dickie Scruggs (“prosecutors have concocted a ‘manufactured crime’ in which his client had no part”) drew a couple of comments from readers who saw Keker’s statements as no more than the zealous advocacy we should expect of a defense attorney. They’ve also been discussing the issue over at the WSJ law blog, where they quote defense attorney Benjamin Brafman’s rapidly disproved boast that his client Mel Weiss “will be fully exonerated,” as well as Monroe Freedman, the Hofstra legal ethicist and regular antipode of views expressed on this site, who

says that generally speaking, he doesn’t see problems with a lawyer making aggressive statements to the press in defense of his client. “We don’t know what the client told the lawyer when the lawyer made the statements,” he says. “We don’t know what Scruggs told his lawyer. We don’t know if Scruggs said I did it, but I want to fight it or something else entirely.”

George Sharswood’s Essay on Professional Responsibility, the standard American text on legal ethics before the modern period, contains the following assertion (pp. 99-100 of Google Books digitized version):

…no counsel can with propriety and good conscience express to court or jury his belief in the justice of his client’s cause, contrary to the fact. Indeed, the occasions are very rare in which he ought to throw the weight of his own private opinion into the scales in favor of the side he has espoused. If that opinion has been formed on a statement of facts not in evidence, it ought not to be heard — it would be illegal and improper in the tribunal to allow any force whatever to it; if on the evidence only, it is enough to show from that the legal and moral grounds on which such opinion rests.

Read On…

“Why Do Lawyers Mouth Clients’ Ridiculous Alibis?”

Letter to the editor, WSJ, Mar. 22 (via YallPolitics):

It’s bad enough and sad enough to read the sorry story of the greed of tort-king “Dickie” Scruggs. The evidence and the transcripts was, of course, damning.

It was really nauseating, however, to read the absurd assertion by John Keker, his lawyer, that Mr. Scruggs was innocent and that the “prosecutors have concocted a ‘manufactured crime’ in which his client had no part” (“A Lawyer’s Trials: Tort King’s Path to Bribery Charge,” page one, March 14). So, according to Mr. Keker, the prosecutors could freely be accused of trying to frame an innocent man.

All Mr. Keker should have said was that his client had pleaded not guilty and that the matter would proceed to trial.

One assumed that when Mr. Keker made factual assertions he was accurately reporting what Mr. Scruggs had told him, since he presumably knew Mr. Scruggs’s side of the story through lengthy interviews under the protection of the attorney-client privilege.

Then we learned, a few hours later, that Mr. Scruggs was guilty all along. Either Mr. Keker knew this or he was ignorant.

Why lawyers in criminal-defense cases feel compelled to make factual assertions about their clients’ innocence, facts which they couldn’t possibly know, is beyond me.

Every day these lawyers appear on television and in the papers repeating the ridiculous alibis of their clients, not as their clients’ legal positions but as facts, only to be ultimately made foolish by a plea or a trial.

Innocent or guilty, a lawyer should retain his dignity and that of his client, if possible.

Felix M. Phillips
Attorney at Law
Minneapolis

More: Discussion continues in this Tuesday post.

Enron lawyers want $695 million; Texas objects

Class action lawyers who went after the various deep pockets in the Enron Corp. collapse — the team was led by now-disgraced William Lerach — want what may be a world record fee for an action of the sort. Highlight: Columbia lawprof John Coffee, whom lawyers often bring in to testify for fee requests, says courts’ eventual rejection of the lawyers’ claims against banks and investment companies — after some had paid fortunes to avoid the risk of trial — is actually a reason to pay the lawyers more, ’cause it shows that they were being creative and taking risks:

The Columbia professor, who was hired to submit a declaration supporting the award of legal fees, said it was a testament to Lerach’s skills that he convinced large corporations to pay billions in a case that turned out to be fatally flawed. “We now know it was an extraordinarily high-risk case because, ultimately, you lost it,” he said.

Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott is among those objecting to the fees as excessive. (Josh Gerstein, “Judge To Mull $695 Million Legal Fee”, New York Sun, Feb. 29; “Texas Objects To Enron Fees”, Mar. 13).