Posts Tagged ‘securities litigation’

Sen. Cornyn introduces lessons-of-Lerach bill

The Texas Republican, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, is introducing legislation that

would make several key reforms to current securities class action law to increase the accountability of and transparency for attorneys filing these lawsuits and the institutional plaintiffs they often represent. Specifically, it would require:

DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND ATTORNEYS

Plaintiffs and attorneys would submit sworn certifications identifying any direct or indirect payments, promises of such payments, and other conflicts of interest between them, as well as all political contributions made to elected officials with authority or influence over the appointment of counsel in the case.

COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR LEAD COUNSEL

Courts would include a competitive bidding process as one of the factors for the selection and retention of lead counsel for a class of plaintiffs.

STUDY TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE ATTORNEYS FEES

GAO would commission a study of the last 5 years of fee awards in securities class action cases to determine the average hourly rate for lead counsel.

(release, Congressional Record statement). (cross-posted from Point of Law). More: hailed by Lisa Rickard of U.S. Chamber.

Damages: $0 settlement; Attorneys’ fees: $9.5 million

The lead plaintiff had claimed losses of $25 million, but settled for zero plus some corporate-governance changes that, as a Rutgers professor notes, probably would have happened anyway. But a settlement approved by a New Jersey federal judge in a shareholder suit against Schering-Plough awarded $9.5 million in attorneys’ fees, even applying a multiplier to lodestar hourly rates. [New Jersey Law Journal/law.com; In re Schering-Plough Corp. Securities Litigation, Case No. 2:01cv829 (D.N.J.)] Paying for those fees: shareholders, who also paid for what were likely multi-million dollar defense costs of litigation. Judge Katharine Sweeney Hayden, when certifying a single class in 2003, rejected arguments that there was an inherent conflict between class members that had already sold their stock and class members who continued to hold stock; she was appointed by Clinton in 1997.

Letter to the editor

In the August 27 Legal Times:

To the editor:

I appreciated the chance to speak with reporter Tony Mauro about Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta, an upcoming Supreme Court case that will be discussed at an AEI panel on Oct. 5. Unfortunately, a sentence in his Aug. 20 article [“High Court Head Count at Issue,” Page 1] incorrectly implied that I thought the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit in the case was an “anti-investor ruling,” when that characterization is solely Mauro’s.

On the contrary, as I have written in The Wall Street Journal and told Mauro, I believe that the 8th Circuit’s dismissal of the case redounds to the benefit of investors in general and that the best result for investors (if not for trial lawyers) would be affirmance by the Supreme Court. And I say that even though I am a putative class member in Stoneridge.

Theodore H. Frank
Resident Fellow
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Washington, D.C.

Stoneridge order

The Supreme Court issued the following order today:

The motion of Former SEC Commissioners for leave to file a brief as amici curiae out of time is granted. The motion of John Conyers, Jr. and Barney Frank for leave to file a brief as amici curiae out of time is granted. The Chief Justice and Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions.

Respondents had objected to the out-of-time filing by the Former SEC Commissioners. Separately, Tony Mauro speculates in the Legal Times whether Roberts or Breyer will “unrecuse” themselves. (Mauro quotes me and Professor Bainbridge (who gets all the good lines); the “anti-investor opinion” language is Mauro’s, however, and not mine: as I wrote in the Wall Street Journal and expressed to Mauro, the lower-court decision was decidedly pro-investor, if anti-trial lawyer.) As the order suggests, however, if Roberts and Breyer are going to divest themselves of Cisco stock so they can participate in the case, they have not done so yet. Earlier: Aug. 15; POL May 20.

Full disclosure: As an unnamed class member, I am a plaintiff in Stoneridge, and would be entitled to some small amount of class recovery. Also, I hate hate hate respondent Scientific-Atlanta with a deep burning passion, not least because Scientific-Atlanta attorneys subjected me to a harassing subpoena. Nevertheless, a victory for petitioners would be disastrous.

Bipartisan group of SEC chairs, law professors, speak out against “scheme liability”

The trial bar’s efforts to broadly expand the securities laws through judicial fiat is challenged in an amicus brief filed in Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta (earlier: Jul. 31, etc.), including former SEC chairs Roderick Hills, Harvey Pitt and Harold Williams; and law professors Richard Epstein, Joseph Grundfest, Stephen Bainbridge, and Larry Ribstein.

Update: Not only has the Department of Justice come out in favor of affirmance (despite extensive lobbying by the plaintiffs’ bar), but both major stock exchanges—who interests unquestionably parallel the interests of investors as a group—filed amicus briefs seeking affirmance. But watch the press portray this as “businesses versus investors” instead of “businesses and investors versus trial lawyers and government officials seeking donations from trial lawyers.”

Update: Oral argument is October 9. AEI will hold a panel discussing the case October 5.

Stoneridge: Wherein I am a footnote

Reps. Barney Frank and John Conyers, Jr. spend taxpayer dollars to file a late amicus brief on behalf of plaintiffs’ lawyers and against investors in Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta, taking issue with my Wall Street Journal op-ed on the case. (H/t L.R.) To wit, “A number of commentators have called for the Court to decide this case by reference to policy considerations nowhere found in the statute.” This is wrong: the op-ed explicitly noted that Congress had twice rejected precisely the sort of liability that petitioners were seeking in this case. It is also ironic: civil securities fraud liability was created by judicial fiat out of a statute that had no private right of action.

Ted on the SEC and Stoneridge

Our own Ted Frank has an op-ed in today’s Wall Street Journal. Excerpt:

…The plaintiffs’ bar is heavily lobbying the SEC to intervene in a pending Supreme Court case, Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta, on the side of a gigantic expansion of private litigation.

The case’s facts are straightforward: Charter Communications purchased set-top cable boxes but got back some of the money in the form of advertising bought by the vendors. Charter executives recorded the outgoing money as a “capital expenditure” (to be depreciated over several years) but the incoming money as revenue recorded within a single year, thus falsely inflating operating cash flow. Three Charter executives went to prison over the shenanigans. Plaintiffs’ attorneys sued Charter and the executives, of course, but named as codefendants two of the vendors, Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta.

The suit makes little sense. The vendors had no say in how Charter accounted for or reported its transactions. Worse is the precedent it represents: How can a business function if it is potentially liable for hundreds of millions because those whom they trade with misreport a day-to-day transaction?…

Indeed, a 1994 Supreme Court decision on its face cuts off such “secondary liability” claims, but hope of reviving them springs eternal in the plaintiff’s bar — one reason for the P.R. campaign aimed at putting pressure on officials like SEC Chairman Chris Cox. (Ted Frank, “‘Arbitrary and Unfair'”, Wall Street Journal, May 31)(sub-only)(cross-posted from Point of Law). Plus: here’s the free AEI version.