The civil litigation death penalty

There’s an old legal joke that goes: “If you’re weak on the facts, pound the law. If you’re weak on the law, pound the facts. If you’re weak on both the facts and the law, pound the table.”

Except the entrepreneurial trial bar has found an intermediate step: instead of pounding the table, pound the discovery requests. Persuade a judge that a discovery snafu was really a deliberate attempt at a cover-up, and get sanctions that prohibit the other side from defending itself. Because plaintiffs rarely have discovery obligations that are more than an infinitesmal fraction of a defendant’s discovery obligations, this can be a profitable strategy.

The strategy is not new–I saw it myself first-hand in the 1990s defending GM, and wrote a piece about a trial where John Edwards successfully used a variant. But as discovery gets more and more complex due to emails, voicemails, and instant-messaging, it becomes easier for the discovery snafu to happen, and it becomes harder for judges to distinguish between good-faith mistakes and bad-faith withholding of documents. You may recall a famous example in Florida where Morgan Stanley was precluded from introducing evidence about a transaction involving Sunbeam before the appellate court threw out the entire case.

A recent example of this sort of gamesmanship is going on now in Florida where a group of lawyers representing Ecuadorian shrimp farmers came up with a brand new implausible theory of their case–now alleging that runoff from a formulation of a Benlate fungicide that stopped being used in 1991 is what caused their damages in the mid-to-late 1990s, all so they can claim to a judge that DuPont’s failure to produce documents about this marginally relevant formulation (which was effectively identical to the other formulations, except it included two inert ingredients) deserved sanctions. And sure enough, the court ordered a civil death penalty: all of DuPont’s defenses have been stricken, even though there is no scientific evidence that fungicide runoff caused the virus that killed many Ecuadorian shrimp. (Aquamar S.A. v. DuPont, Case No. 97-020375 (Broward County, Fla.))

A similar case involving Goodyear and a civil death penalty sanction that resulted in a $30 million verdict is pending in the Nevada Supreme Court.

A word for Hosting Matters

Hosting Matters offerNo, we haven’t begun accepting advertising, but we figured we’d put in a good word for Hosting Matters, whose hosting services we’ve been using for years and whose support staff over that time have helped extricate us from more than one baffling technical impasse arising from software oddities, DOS attacks and so forth. If you follow the linked graphic, or just click here, you’ll find the details of a promotion they’re doing for an “unmetered” hosting plan (not quite the same as “unlimited”, as they explain) which provides a lot of availability at a low price for those who manage growing websites. If you sign up through us, we also get some sort of credit on our own hosting bill, which I suppose puts this in the category of blog posts that the Federal Trade Commission is so keen on regulating.

U.K.: “Even mathematicians run scared of our libel laws now”

According to Nick Cohen in the Observer/Guardian, some British mathematicians are afraid to publish critiques of “quant” models and techniques employed in the banking and financial worlds for fear of being taken to court under the country’s famously pro-plaintiff defamation laws. More on the Singh case (critic sued by chiropractic association) here and here.

“Lawsuit claims Apple, Mafia sent threats via iPod”

Anyone suing over anything dept.: a Florissant, Mo. man proceeding pro se (without a lawyer) “is suing Apple because he says two of the company’s iPods contained illegal receivers that allowed the Mafia to send him threatening messages, according to court documents obtained by CNET. … The alleged motive for the threats was that the Mafia wanted McKenna to work as a fashion model for them at a New York modeling agency.” The suit also names the St. Louis County police department and other defendants. [CNet, The Petition Site, AppleInsider, Gizmodo]

July 19 roundup

  • Federal court rules “shy bladder syndrome” an ADA-protected disability [World of Work via Hyman]
  • “Goldman Sachs Backs Down in Long Legal Battle With Blogger” [American Lawyer, WSJ Law Blog, Coleman, earlier]
  • San Diego: unforeseen consequences of “anti-blight” lender regulation [Outside the Box]
  • 1,000 lose jobs as environmental litigation halts Northern California refinery project [Wood, ShopFloor, update]
  • City of Detroit lawyers on ethical hot seat after former mayor’s texting coverup scandal [ABA Journal, earlier]
  • What happens when IP law firms breed homegrown patent trolls? [Ron Coleman]
  • “It’s kind of like the practice of law, except that the clients are more likely to leave happy.” [Glenn Reynolds being naughty on Instapundit]
  • U.K.: Owner of copyright to John Cage’s avant-garde “four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence” work sues later impresario whose album track includes one minute of silence [seven years ago on Overlawyered; New Yorker treatment]

“Few plaintiffs in Ford case use coupons as lawyers reap millions”

Sacramento Bee:

Fewer than 100 consumers out of a million covered in a class-action lawsuit settled in Sacramento Superior Court have redeemed coupons to buy a new Ford, but that hasn’t stopped their lawyers from cashing in on a sweet payday.

So far, the dollar value remitted to plaintiffs in the Ford Explorer rollover class-action lawsuit has added up to about $37,500. Meanwhile, squadrons of lawyers from 13 firms from Sacramento to Woodbridge, N.J., have raked in more than $25 million in attorneys’ fees and expenses.

More: The Recorder. And Ted in comments flags our coverage of the case two years ago.

Medicare qui tam: a health care bill surprise

Contacts on Capitol Hill inform me that Republicans yesterday managed to block a remarkable provision that had been slipped into the House leadership’s 794-page health care bill just before it went to a House Ways & Means markup session. If their description of the provision is accurate — and my initial reading of the language gives me no reason to think it isn’t — it sounds as if they managed to (for the moment) hold off one of the more audacious and far-reaching trial lawyer power grabs seen on Capitol Hill in a while.

For some time now the federal government has been intensifying its pursuit of what are sometimes known as “Medicare liens” against third party defendants (more). In the simplest scenario — not the only scenario, as we will see below — someone is injured in, say, a car accident, and has the resulting medical bills paid by Medicare. They then sue and successfully obtain damages from the other driver. At this point Medicare (i.e. the government) is free to demand that the beneficiary hand over some or all of the settlement to cover the cost of the health care, but under some conditions it is also free to file its own action to recover the medical outlays directly from the negligent driver (who in some circumstances might even wind up paying for the same medical bills twice). It might do this if, for example, it does not expect to get a collectible judgment from the beneficiary.

The newly added language in the Thursday morning version of the health bill (for those following along, it’s Section 1620 on pp. 713-721) would greatly expand the scope of these suits against third parties, while doing something entirely new: allow freelance lawyers to file them on behalf of the government — without asking permission — and collect rich bounties if they manage thereby to extract money from the defendants. Lawyers will recognize this as a qui tam procedure, of the sort that has led to a growing body of litigation filed by freelance bounty-hunters against universities, defense contractors and others alleged to have overcharged the government.

It gets worse. Language on p. 714 of the bill would permit the lawyers to file at least some sorts of Medicare recovery actions based on “any relevant evidence, including but not limited to relevant statistical or epidemiological evidence, or by other similarly reliable means”. This reads very much as if an attempt is being made to lay the groundwork for claims against new classes of defendants who might not be proved liable in an individual case but are responsible in a “statistical” sense. The best known such controversies are over whether suppliers of products such as alcohol, calorie-laden foods, or guns should be compelled to pay compensation for society-wide patterns of illness or injury.

A few other highlights of the provision, pending analysis by persons more familiar with Social Security and Medicare law than myself:

  • A bit of language on p. 714, I am told, would remove a significant barrier to litigation, namely a rule authorizing a lien action to be filed on behalf of Medicare only after a previous “judgment”, that is to say, only after the success of an earlier lawsuit (by the injured party) establishing responsibility for the injury.
  • Language on p. 715 would double damages in cases of “intentional tort or other intentional wrongdoing”.
  • P. 716 specifies that “any person” may bring the action, that is, it need not be a lawyer representing the injured person or any other injured person.
  • P. 717: the bounty would be a rich one, 30 percent plus expenses. P. 719 provides that even if the federal government itself intervenes and insists on taking over the lawsuit, the bounty-hunter would still get a minimum of 20 percent, perhaps as reward for winning the race to the courthouse. No one other than the federal government could oust the first-to-file lawyer from control of the action, so other private lawyers who lost the race to the courthouse would be out of luck. Page 720 specifies that the suit may be settled “notwithstanding the objections of the United States” — that is, the objections of the entity on whose behalf it was supposedly filed — if a court so agrees.
  • Medicare would have to cooperate with the private lawyers, whether or not the government joined or approved of the action, by handing over various documents useful to them.

For the moment, at least, the bullet seems to have been dodged. Some Republicans on the committee spotted the issue and raised strong protests, and by the end of the day an agreement had been reached with Democratic managers to withdraw the provision. That still provides no guarantee that it will not rear its head later in the process at some stage that proponents judge more favorable to their designs.

The idea being promoted here is an atrocious one. Even when it comes to garden-variety torts, there are many entirely legitimate reasons why federal managers might not decide to pursue Medicare liens from every possible defendant. To take only one example, they might have scruples about suing peripheral defendants who might be made to cough up settlement money to avoid the costs of litigation but against whom liability was doubtful. Freelance private lawyers would be free to sue everyone in sight and employ the most hardball tactics along the way. If the language about epidemiological and statistical evidence is indeed meant to pave the way for future suits against liquor, gun or cheeseburger purveyors, it represents a stealth attempt to restore via fine print a lawyerly dream that the courts have almost uniformly rejected over the past decade, as well as personally enrich lawyers with fees that could soar beyond even those of the scandalous tobacco-Medicaid litigation. Who in Congress slipped this language in, anyway — and on whose behalf?

Incidentally, this is not the first time the idea of Medicare-lien/”secondary payer” qui tam has been given an outing. In 2006 the famous Erin Brockovich lent her name and efforts to lawsuits filed by Wilkes & McHugh and another law firm pursuing the highly adventurous theory that a qui tam right to sue over tort-induced Medicare overpayments already exists, at least against hospitals. This campaign fared extremely poorly in court (see our earlier coverage here, here, and here). Last year, in a case argued by Kenneth Connor for Wilkes & McHugh, the Sixth Circuit ruled that claims brought by Wilkes’s client against dozens of hospitals were “utterly frivolous” and ordered counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for “unreasonable and vexatious” appeals (Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, PDF; more at Jones Day site). (reposted with slight changes and bumped from an earlier post this morning) (& welcome Popehat, Coyote, Weisenthal/Business Insider, Hemingway/NRO “Corner”, For What It’s Worth, Blogs for Victory, TigerHawk, The Agitator, Colossus of Rhodey readers).